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What Makes a Computation Unconventional?
or, there is no such thing as Non-Turing
Computation
S. Barry Cooper
University of Leeds, UK
Turing’s standard model of computation, and its physical counterpart,
has given rise to a powerful paradigm. There are assumptions underlying
the paradigm which constrain our thinking about the realities of computing,
not least when we doubt the paradigm’s adequacy.
There are assumptions concerning the logical structure of computation,
and the character of its reliance on the data it feeds on. There is a corre-
sponding complacency spanning theoretical – but not experimental – think-
ing about the complexity of information, and its mathematics. We point to
ways in which classical computability can clarify the nature of apparently
unconventional computation. At the same time, we seek to expose the de-
vices used in both theory and practice to try and extend the scope of the
standard model. This involves a drawing together of different approaches,
in a way that validates the intuitions of those who question the standard
model, while providing them with a unifying vision of diverse routes “beyond
the Turing barrier”.
The results of such an analysis are radical in their consequences, and
break the mould in a way that has not been possible previously. The aim is
not to question, invalidate or supplant the richness of contemporary thinking
about computation. A modern computer is not just a universal Turing
machine. But the understanding the model brought us was basic to the
building of today’s digital age. It gave us computability, an empowering
insight, and computing with consciousness. What is there fundamental that
unconventional computation directs us to? What is it makes a computation
unconventional? And having fixed on a plausible answer to this question, we
ask: To what extent can the explanatory power of the mathematics clarify
key issues relating to emergence, basic physics, and the supervenience of
mentality on its material host?
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1 METHOD OVER MATTER
There is a huge literature concerning computability. It has grown beyond
what anyone might have anticipated back in the 1930s. The subject has
taken on a life of its own, the context has spread across disciplinary bound-
aries in a startling way and ideas are increasingly hard to categorise and
evaluate within traditional structures. During the 2012 centenary of Alan
Turing’s birth, we were reminded that some of the most important early
contributions to the computing revolution came from people who thought
deeply about the way the world computes, while gaining strength from their
independence of what other people had done. Thank you, Turing. Relieved
of the burden of the taxonomy of who said what and when, let us start by
mapping out some of the main features of the standard model of computa-
tion. Or rather, the main features of how a starting student in computability
might unwrap the model.
The most basic feature, a feature not just of Turing’s 1936 Turing ma-
chine but of all the equivalent models, is its disembodiment. We might have
been told at some point that it was devised as a disembodying model of ma-
chine computation. Not so, of course. 2012 has made everyone aware of the
very specific physicality of the computing situation that Turing was mod-
elling, the predominantly women ‘computers’ following instructions. One
of the special strengths of the Turing model is its close relationship with
physical computation, via a very specific deconstruction of a typical compu-
tational context. We have but a confused idea of what a machine might be.
We have a firmer grip on what a ‘computer’ following instructions might be
doing, using well-defined workspace, tools and conventions. The underlying
physicality may be highly complex. But such things as the human com-
puter’s aches and pains, her feelings of hunger or boredom, are factored out
of the process. We extract emergent features of the material context which
are far from disembodiments of the computation, but which give us a model
which we may re-embody in quite different contexts, and whose mathemat-
ical properties can be investigated with a realistic hope of relevance to a
wide spectrum of controlled situations.
This provides a green light to those who would turn such a superficial
take on physical computation back on its host. In the absence of a cor-
responding deconstruction of more complex physicality – and ignoring the
fact that even more ad-hoc descriptions of particle physics, life, cosmology,
human mentality etc. are incomplete – the temptation is to turn the Turing
model into metaphor, and then into extended model, in ways we can only
argue about. The disembodiment implicit in the standard model is not so
simple. It has a character which we should not ignore. Surfing the compu-
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tational world is fun, but the underlying complexity may still surprise.
We have dwelled on the basic particularity and oddness of the standard
model. It is relevant to what we expect of other aspects of the dominant
paradigm. Before Turing and logicians like Emil Post, Kurt Go¨del, Alonzo
Church, and Stephen Kleene came on the scene, an important input to
a computation was the computing machine itself. Physically the machine
embodied a weighty piece of data. The logician’s overview provided an ex-
traction of its essentials in the form of a simple code – a natural number,
a finite binary string, or other similar mathematical object. This provided
two hugely important features of the standard model, and the modern com-
putational world.
Firstly, however we structure our machines, their descriptions can be
converted into data used by machines based on a different logical analysis,
enabling the construction of algorithms for converting ‘programs’ within one
framework into one fitting with another. Much activity of the early investi-
gators involved devising such algorithms (say, for converting a description of
a λ-computable function into one for an equivalent Turing computable func-
tion). The natural conclusion was that Turing machines could ‘compute
anything’.
Secondly, having trivialised the hardware, the power of the computing
paradigm lay in the programming. And with a model which turned ma-
chines into data, it was a short step to building a machine which could
mine machines for different purposes out of whatever data you gave it – and
having decoded the program from the data, could implement it. This was
the origin of the so-called ‘universal Turing machine’. By a simple mathe-
matical sleight of hand, one had moved machine from physical world to the
realm of pure thought. Well, not quite, as Charles Babbage found out in
the process of getting his Analytical Engine built prior to 1871. Of course,
Babbage’s machine, like others pre-dating the 1948 Manchester Small-Scale
Experimental Machine (SSEM), or ‘Manchester Baby’, was not universal
machine in the sense of a modern stored-program computer.
Today’s computers are a true embodiment of Turing’s universal machine
in that they enable programs to be combined and edited in increasingly cre-
ative ways, without the need for any rebuilding of the programmer-computer
physical interface. Nowadays, the program, once input, becomes part of the
computer, to be stored, adapted or discarded by the programmer with-
out any grappling with punched cards or realigning of wired connections
or switches. Early designs of Babbage, Konrad Zuse and others are ‘Tur-
ing complete’, but lack the vital stored-program feature. This important
ingredient of Turing’s 1936 logical analysis was incorporated by John von
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Neumann in his June 1945 EDVAC report, and also features, much less
influentially, in Turing’s report on the ACE of later that same year.
Universality; the transposability of computational activity from one com-
puting platform to another; the supplanting of the physical by the logical;
the redundancy of information beyond the type 1 or type 2 mathematical
level — these are familiar aspects of an overarching computational paradigm.
The underlying assumptions have served us well, and moulded our thinking
about the wider context. One can recognise it in early approaches to arti-
ficial intelligence. In the philosophy of mind one has various functionalist
viewpoints, with Hilary Putnam explicitly drawing on the universal machine
metaphor in his seminal 1960s writings on the topic. Again, in computer
science one has the allied notion of ‘virtual machine’ quite validly useful in
both practical and theoretical contexts. One observes the paradigm in the
drive to reduce social interaction and development to the algorithmic, set-
ting complex interactive processes within simple rule-based game structures.
The feedback between the emergent and the algorithmic, to which we return
below, does not fit well with ‘corporate thinking’, with its drive for strategic
certainty.
In computer science and mathematics the paradigm can be detected
in sophisticated approaches to the logic of computation, focused on the
value of frameworks transferable not just between specific contexts, but
between different disciplines. Categorical methods have been productive in
the computational context, where according to Samson Abramsky “in the
work on concurrent processes, the behaviour is the object of interest.
2 PROCESS AND EMBODIMENT
History brings its own reminders that computers are not ‘just’ universal
Turing machines. Moving the model from the human ‘computers’ platform
to a more efficient and cost-effective electronic platform was highly non-
trivial. Apart from this, the re-embodiment of computing brought us closer
to the main point of Turing’s 1936 paper — a proof that there are interesting
questions beyond the reach of algorithms. In retrospect, one can rephrase
this as “computers are stupid”, and go on to ask if a 14 billion year old
universe is subject to similar limitations. Is the mathematics of Turing’s
simple diagonalisation of the computable reals unembodiable?
The sort of problems Turing and Alonzo Church showed to be unsolvable
by a computer were very natural in an everyday sense. From Turing we know
that if U is a universal Turing machine then there is no computer can tell
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us , for an arbitrary input x, whether U will ever produce an output from
x. This is the ‘unsolvability of the Halting Problem’ for U, with the set of
numbers x on whichU halts called the Halting Set forU. Remembering that
x can code a program, this gives us an indication of why computer program
checking is such a tough problem. The process tends to be experimental,
with a new piece of software requiring a sequence of updates to fix various
bugs.
Even closer to home is ‘Church’s Theorem’ — actually Turing proved
it too, it is just the negative solution to Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem.
This says that if you have a sentence in everyday language (as formalised in
first-order logic), there is no computer that can tell us of any such sentence
whether it is logically valid or not. To many this is quite informative and
counter-intuitive.
One can extract from each of these problems a binary expression for a
real number r. Say r = 0 · r0r1 . . . , with each ri = 0 or 1, where ri = 1
exactly when U successfully computes on input x = i. U can be thought to
‘compute’ r in the sense that this number is uniquely decided by the actions
of U in computing on 0, 1, 2, . . . successively. r is a very real feature of the
real world in which U lives and operates. However, the level of abstraction
of r means that even though we can ‘see’ U computing, we cannot ‘see’ r at
all well. If we could see r we would be moved to allow that it it is ‘computed’
in some sense. Of course, r does not fit into the classical paradigm, since
r is not available as an input to further computation by U. Not only can
we not see r, nor can U. And this is not just due to the incomputability. r
as a mathematical object is of higher type than the natural numbers which
U usually accepts as an input. Anyway, in the absence of an embodied
presence, r is not considered a computed outcome.
Mathematically, r is definable from U, but the existential quantifier
needed to define it puts r on the other side of an unembodied chasm. The
question arises: Can this chasm be crossed given the right material condi-
tions?
There is an obvious counterpart of this elevation of type, and Turing’s
proof of a resulting incomputability. The non-locality of the view amounts
to a logical interactivity between computations. The observing process pro-
vides the connectivity, with us a player in the physical environment. We are
no longer in the presence of an individual computation, it is an interactive
process at work, with what we will subsequently recognise as an emergent in-
computable real r. We will come to regard emergent as real world analogue
of ‘definable’. Emergence plays an important role in many dynamical sys-
tems, such as weather systems, large scale social interactions, the internet,
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biology, creative thinking, and turbulent environments of many kinds.
Definability is commonly ignored, or regarded as a logician’s playground,
with important instantiations in the wider mathematical context. A useful
‘missing link’ is the fractal, with both precise mathematical description and
a visual presence, often enhanced via computer simulation.
In a formal sense, the Halting Problem is in the same world as the Man-
delbrot set, for instance. We have gone up another level of the type structure,
but there is an in-principle connection. We have a simple computable rule
hosted by the complex numbers. Based on this there is a two-quantifier
definition of the members of the Mandelbrot set, which with a little ma-
nipulation can be reduced to a one-quantifier expression for the purpose of
the well-known computer simulation. The computability or otherwise of the
Mandelbrot set is still an open problem. But unlike our incomputable Halt-
ing Set, the Mandelbrot set comes beautifully and interestingly embodied,
with quite visual counterparts to the suspected incomputability. There it
is on our computer screen. And we can delve as deeply as we like into this
fascinatingly surprising type-2 object. The reason for this is that we are
sampling this set of complex numbers. The computer screen image involves
a trick reduction of type. Turing himself was familiar with the usefulness of
statistical sampling for reducing complex information to something compu-
tationally approachable. It is not a purely ad hoc methodology. It is a way
of recognising the higher type computability enabled by a definition, or by
some real world process to whose computational underpinnings we are not
privy.
Moving beyond our mathematical comfort zone, we can observe many
everyday examples of emergence as instances of objects definable in a real
context. We see apparently chaotic environments involving generation of
informational complexity via simple rules with a computational character.
And we further observe the accompanying, often surprising, emergence of
new regularities — such as those of Robert Shaw’s dripping taps — entropic
resting points, often at most observable via the sort of selective sampling
which made visible the embodied Mandelbrot set.
The embodied computation of higher type objects is not in itself a chal-
lenge to the classical model. But its character does mell with intuitions
concerning unconventionality of computation. And the parallel with the es-
tablished incomputable r and its mathematical context certainly rings the
alarm bells.
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3 EMERGENCE AND DEFINABILITY
All around us we see a world exhibiting algorithmic content accompanied
by hierarchical structure not easily explainable in terms of the familiar un-
derlying rules. Our everyday lives are built around what appears to be a
computable environment, but nature continually surprises us. Much of that
surprise is attached to natural form which does appear to be part of a uni-
verse which ‘knows what it is doing’, and it is this we think of as ‘emergent’.
The importance of getting a mathematical grip on this omnipresent phe-
nomenon — in evidence from ‘strange attractors’ to human creativity, and
from the origins of life to large-scale cosmic structure — is illustrated by
the history of ‘British Emergentism’, and its heyday in the 1920s. One of
the leaders of the movement was the Cambridge philosopher C. D. Broad.
Here he is1 in 1925, attempting an explanation of what emergence is, while
pointing to illustrative examples:
. . . the characteristic behaviour of the whole . . . could not, even
in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the
behaviour of its components . . . This .. . . is what I understand by
the ‘Theory of Emergence’. I cannot give a conclusive example of
it, since it is a matter of controversy whether it actually applies
to anything . . . I will merely remark that, so far as I know at
present, the characteristic behaviour of Common Salt cannot be
deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties
of Sodium in isolation; or of Chlorine in isolation; or of other
compounds of Sodium, . . .
Dramatic scientific developments were in progress around this time. 1925
saw the key elements of the new quantum mechanics put in place by Werner
Heisenberg and Erwin Schro¨dinger, and by the 5th Solvay conference in 1927
quantum theory was revolutionising the foundations of chemistry. The mys-
tery was stripped from the examples from chemistry of Broad and others.2
For Stuart Kauffman3 emergence is not just an example of unconven-
tional computation, it calls into question basic assumptions about the com-
putational content of causality and the deterministic character of the uni-
verse:
1C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place In Nature, Kegan-Paul, London, 1925, p.59.
2 See Brian McLaughlin’s article “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism”, in Emer-
gence or Reduction? – Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism (A. Becker-
mann, H. Flohr, J. Kim, eds.), de Gruyter, Berlin, 1992, pp.49–93.
3Stuart Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason and Reli-
gion, Basic Books, 2008, p.281.
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We are beyond reductionism: life, agency, meaning, value, and
even consciousness and morality almost certainly arose naturally,
and the evolution of the biosphere, economy, and human culture
are stunningly creative often in ways that cannot be foretold,
indeed in ways that appear to be partially lawless. The latter
challenge to current science is radical. It runs starkly counter
to almost four hundred years of belief that natural laws will be
sufficient to explain what is real anywhere in the universe, a view
I have called the Galilean spell. The new view of emergence and
ceaseless creativity partially beyond natural law is a truly new
scientific worldview in which science itself has limits.
Such claims are counterbalanced by words of caution from Ronald Arkin4:
Emergence is often invoked in an almost mystical sense regarding
the capabilities of behavior-based systems. Emergent behavior
implies a holistic capability where the sum is considerably greater
than its parts. It is true that what occurs in a behavior-based
system is often a surprise to the system’s designer, but does the
surprise come because of a shortcoming of the analysis of the
constituent behavioral building blocks and their coordination,
or because of something else?
In the face of historic confusions, and radical contemporary speculations,
the clarifying role of mathematics is urgently needed. This is not to brush
aside the more detailed proposals of Kauffman and others. The aim is to
place them in a more foundational framework.
To this end, one needs more than the codifying of current ‘best observa-
tional practice’ represented by the Test of Emergence of Ronald, Sipper and
Capcarre`re in Design, observation, surprise! A test of emergence (Artificial
Life, 5 (1999), 225–239). Here is a summary of their qualifying criteria:
1) Design: The system has been constructed by the designer, by describ-
ing local elementary interactions between components (e.g., artificial
creatures and elements of the environment) in a language L1.
2) Observation: The observer is fully aware of the design, but describes
global behaviors and properties of the running system, over a period
of time, using a language L2.
4Ronald C. Arkin, Behaviour-Based Robotics, MIT Press, 1998, p.105.
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3) Surprise: The language of design L1 and the language of observation
L2 are distinct, and the causal link between the elementary interactions
programmed in L1 and the behaviors observed in L2 is non-obvious to
the observer – who therefore experiences surprise. In other words,
there is a cognitive dissonance between the observer’s mental image of
the system’s design stated in L1 and his contemporaneous observation
of the system’s behavior stated in L2.
Might this serve as a test for unconventional computation? Unconventional-
ity certainly requires some obstacle to reduction to basic algorithmic struc-
ture. And it is hard to design a computational device which has no under-
pinning of classical ingredients. On the other hand, there are potentially
incomputable processes in nature for which 1) or 2) fail. Can a founda-
tional approach make computational sense of the outcome of a quantum
measurement leading to a collapse of the wave function?
A nice aspect of the above test is its differentiation between ‘designer’
and ‘observer’ languages. This is a feature of the fragmentary nature of sci-
ence, where it is common to view, say, biology as emergent from an under-
lying quantum mechanical base, with its own emergent rules and language,
non-reducible to the quantum level on which it depends. In the case of
the Halting Set for a universal Turing machine, L2 is distinguished by the
addition of quantification.
Alan Turing recognised something computationally interesting in emer-
gence when he investigated the mathematics of morphogenesis. In the early
1950s Turing wrote his groundbreaking paper on The chemical basis of Mor-
phogenesis, in which he proposed a simple reaction-diffusion system describ-
ing chemical reactions and diffusion to account for morphogenesis in a range
of cases. He even ran computer programs on the early Manchester Mark 1
computer (a more powerful successor to the ‘Baby’) with the aim of verify-
ing his reaction-diffusion ‘design’ underlying such emergent patterns as the
familiar black and white dappling on a Holstein dairy cow.
What is specially interesting about this work is how it related the pow-
erful descriptive framework of differential equations to emergent form in
nature, so exhibiting a connection between the mathematics of higher type
objects and apparent emergence. It is hard to claim computational uncon-
ventionality on this basis – the solutions to Turing’s equations tended to
be computable – but then mathematics provides us with little means of
identifying real world incomputability. Reducing the Halting Problem to an
elusive solution to a non-linear differential equation is not very likely. on the
other hand, Marian Pour-el and Ian Richards had some success designing
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‘A computable ordinary differential equation which possesses no computable
solution’5
To summarise: Turing provided examples of descriptions of emergent
phenomena, whereby one might characterise the emergence as an expression
of a higher type computation. And this fits well with the Ronald-Sipper-
Capcarre`re test for emergence, via the provision of each of design, obser-
vation and surprise. With the latter mathematically traceable back to the
type-climbing and concomitant potential incomputability of the emergent
form.
Is it pure serendipity the discovery that some phenomena can be de-
scribed in terms of material context? There is a strong intuition that form
in the universe arises for a reason. Scientifically this intuition takes the
form of an expectation of finding descriptions of phenomena in terms of
basic laws of nature. An echo of such an expectation be traced back to
Gottfried Leibniz’s 1714 description6 of his ‘principle of sufficient reason’:
. . . there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true
proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being
so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in
most cases.
The intuition that natural phenomena not only generate descriptions,
but arise and derive from them, connects with a useful abstraction associated
with Alfred Tarski, and growing out of his 1930s work on the notion of
truth for formal languages. Mathematical definability, or more generally
invariance under automorphisms of an appropriate structure, provides an
effective organiser of the relative ontology of relations over a structure.
Definability is a basic notion which deserves to be better known in the
mathematical world, and in the wider scientific community. It’s relevance to
physics has been long recognised. Hans Reichenbach worked to axiomatise
Einstein’s relativity in the 1920s, a project carried forward in relation to
general relativity today by the Budapest group of Istva´n Ne´meti and Ha-
jnal Andre´ka. This extension of the fundamental mathematics enables us
to deal with a wider range of phenomena, taking us beyond the classical
computational model. It gives precision to our experience of emergence as
a potentially trans-algorithmic determinant of phenomena.
The overarching aim now is to describe global relations in range of con-
texts in terms of local structure, so capturing the emergence of large scale
5In: Annals of Mathematical Logic Volume 17, November 1979, Pages 6190.
6See The Monadology, sections 31, 32.
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formations. And mathematically to formalise such descriptions as definabil-
ity, or as invariance over basic computational structure. Although Stephen
Kleene provided formal content to the notion of higher type computation
via a series of papers spanning over 30 years (1959–1991), the physical rele-
vance of his take on the topic needs to be clarified. A forthcoming book on
“Computability At Higher Types” by John Longley and Dag Normann is
eagerly anticipated. The intuition is that computational unconventionality
certainly entails higher type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced
respect for embodied information. There is some understanding of the al-
gorithmic content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the
surface.
4 PHYSICS AND DEFINABILITY
When a Nobel Prize winner in Physics is quoted as saying7:
The state of physics today is like it was when we were mysti-
fied by radioactivity . . . They were missing something absolutely
fundamental. We are missing perhaps something as profound as
they were back then.
people take notice. And this from 2004 winner David Gross did cause some-
thing of a stir.
This section is in the nature of a road test for the conceptual frame-
work we have been building up around the notion of unconventionality of
a computation. We briefly outline various gaps in the ‘standard model’ of
physics and point to the how a more basic viewpoint can help. The dis-
cussion will consist of a brief commentary centred around some revealing
quotations from physicists themselves.
We start with Einstein himself complaining about the resort to ad hoc
elements of physical theories:
. . . I would like to state a theorem which at present can not be
based upon anything more than upon a faith in the simplicity, i.e.
intelligibility, of nature . . . nature is so constituted that it is pos-
sible logically to lay down such strongly determined laws that
within these laws only rationally completely determined con-
stants occur (not constants, therefore, whose numerical value
could be changed without destroying the theory) . . .
7David Gross, quoted in New Scientist, Dec. 10 2005, “Nobel Laureate Admits String
Theory Is In Trouble”.
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Notice that this is not just an exhortation to physicists to look for a better
theory. It is an expression of faith in the fact that a theory which successfully
defines the observable universe should itself be determined by the universe.
That is, what we observe is there because the universe is ‘self organising’
itself, as one would expect of an emergent system with sufficient invariance
of its structure to exhibit a high degree of mathematical rigidity. An inter-
esting question is the extent to which constants of the model which make it
work, but which are not measurable, are actually defined. In general, one
can interpret the necessity of certain values of the constants to make the
model work as a sort of invariance. What we suspect of invariance is an elu-
siveness of algorithmic infrastructure to the relationship between the local
and global which makes it possible that aspects of reality are dependent on
basic information in a way that is impossible for us to theoretically unravel.
We identify below a mathematical model within which to host basic com-
putable causality. Characterising the automorphisms of this model promises
to be a key task.
Here is a more recent questioning of progress towards a more comprehen-
sive model of physics, from Peter Woit, author of the book Not Even Wrong
– The Failure of String Theory and the Continuing Challenge to Unify the
Laws of Physics (Jonathan Cape, 2006):
By 1973, physicists had in place what was to become a fantasti-
cally successful theory of fundamental particles and their inter-
actions, a theory that was soon to acquire the name of the stan-
dard model. Since that time, the overwhelming triumph of the
standard model has been matched by a similarly overwhelming
failure to find any way to make further progress on fundamental
questions.
And one of Peter Woit’s concerns is those undefined constants:
One way of thinking about what is unsatisfactory about the stan-
dard model is that it leaves seventeen non-trivial numbers still
to be explained, . . .
Alan Guth, originator of the inflationary hypothesis, would like to see
the laws of physics defined:
If the creation of the universe can be described as a quantum
process, we would be left with one deep mystery of existence:
What is it that determined the laws of physics?
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If we think we are observing the universe defining its own laws, we can but
hope to have access to the defining process in the course of time.
We are talking here about hugely unconventional computation. It may
be so unconventional that for us it is hardly computation at all. But its
existence can be framed as a something feasibly approachable, at least in
principle. Roger Penrose8 calls it ‘Strong Determinism’:
[According to Strong Determinism] . . . all the complication,
variety and apparent randomness that we see all about us, as
well as the precise physical laws, are all exact and unambiguous
consequences of one single coherent mathematical structure.
In our final section, we fill in the missing ingredient — namely, the funda-
mental mathematical host for all this embodied information, definability and
higher order computation. Before that, a remark regarding mathematical
structures: Mathematical structures commonly consist of objects connected
by operations or relations. Sometimes the difference between these classes
is blurred, but in an interesting structure there are objects which accumu-
late information expressive of their context in the structure. Sometimes
this information can be ‘read’ by the relations on the structure, which ex-
press a formal ‘causality’, whereby the distribution of information itself has
a structure. This appears to be a feature of our own universe.
5 MODELLING BASIC CAUSALITY
Another quotation, this time from Lee Smolin’s 2006 book on The Trouble
with Physics, p.241:
. . . causality itself is fundamental . . .
The ‘early champions’ of the role of causality mentioned by Smolin – Roger
Penrose, Rafael Sorkin, Fay Dowker, Fotini Markopoulou – make a doughty
bunch, formidable protagonists in contemporary turf wars around quantum
gravity, causal sets and a hydra-headed superstring theory. The aim, as
outlined by Smolin, is a more comprehensively immanent universe9:
It is not only the case that the spacetime geometry determines
what the causal relations are. This can be turned around: Causal
relations can determine the spacetime geometry . . . Its easy to
8Roger Penrose: Quantum physics and conscious thought, in Quantum Implications:
Essays in honour of David Bohm (B.J. Hiley and F.D. Peat, eds.), pp.106-107.
9Lee Smolin, The Trouble With Physics, p.241.
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talk about space or spacetime emerging from something more
fundamental, but those who have tried to develop the idea have
found it difficult to realize in practice. . . .We now believe they
failed because they ignored the role that causality plays in space-
time. These days, many of us working on quantum gravity be-
lieve that causality itself is fundamental – and is thus meaningful
even at a level where the notion of space has disappeared.
Note that we are talking about very specific observed and computation-
ally well-served causality here, which largely frees us from the strictures of
John Earman10 regarding the more wide-ranging use of the term:
. . . the most venerable of all the philosophical definitions [of de-
terminism] holds that the world is deterministic just in case every
event has a cause. The most immediate objection to this ap-
proach is that it seeks to explain a vague concept - determinism
- in terms of a truly obscure one - causation.
In fact, a primary objective of this modelling of basic computable causality is
the clarity that the mathematics of the model brings to less easily described
causality, and to issues regarding over causation, downward causation and
non-locality.
The question is, what kind of causality fails to engage with the infor-
mational content of the reality it structures? The relevance of the question
derives from the fact that it is causal structure from which information
derives and whereby it is stored. Computation is about information, and
potentially equipped to model the way in which the basic causality of our
universe respects and transports information. Once again it was Turing
who gave us a precise formulation corresponding to the fundamentality of
the intuition.
Alan Turing’s 1939 paper is a neglected masterpiece — less cited than the
more famous trio of papers that gave us the universal Turing machine, the
Turing test for intelligence, and the mathematics of morphogenesis — but
crackling with ideas and perceptive intuitions. The oracle Turing machine as
it came to be called appears on just one page of this densely argued article.
Essentially, it equips the computer – in the form of a Turing machine – to
roam the scientific universe of real numbers, accepting type 1 inputs, and
outputting, if we are lucky, type 1 outputs. This sometimes described as
relative computation.
10In A Primer On Determinism, D. Reidel/Kluwer, 1986, p.5.
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An oracle Turing machine exactly expresses the character of basic causal-
ity in the world, progressively sampling information and transferring it com-
prehensively across time and space.
The mathematician or computer scientist — and maybe Turing himself
at the time of its invention — regards the oracle machine as a model of how
we might compute using data given to us from an unknown source. This
viewpoint, together with observation of the apparent actuality of incom-
putability in the natural universe, provides the basis for Jack Copeland’s
notion of hyper computation (beyond the Turing barrier).
But the physicist is presented with a model — the Turing universe —
within which the computable content of Newtonian dynamics comfortably
fits; at a basic level of course. As Poincare´ speculated, and researchers
from Kreisel in 1970, to Beggs, Costa and Tucker today observed, more
broadly interactive contexts based on Newton’s laws can generate infinitary
mathematics with attendant incomputabilities.
Mathematically, the type-2 computable functions Φ over the reals are
termed Turing – or partial computable (p.c.) – functionals. Turing, despite
his longterm interest in interactive computation (mainly between humans
and machines), seems to have never mentioned his oracle machines again.
It was left to another highly creative but under-appreciated mathematician,
Emil Post, 15 years older than Turing, to set in motion the mathematical
development of Turing’s model. In 1944 Post defined the degrees of unsolv-
ability – later called the Turing degrees – as a classification of reals in terms
of their relative computability.
Strangely, the subsequent investigation of the mathematical character
of the Turing degree structure was a process entirely detached from reality.
There was no sense at all of relevance to the real world. The fact that the
Turing universe underpinned a wide range of dynamical contexts in which
the ‘design’ was understood meant nothing. The possibility that all sorts of
higher structure might be better understood via an analysis of definability or
invariance in the basic underlying model was never entertained. I was there
through a golden age of technical development. Turing was gone, taking
with him his broadly questioning brilliance, leaving behind a universally
adopted computational paradigm. We recursion theorists were busy doing
our sums while the natural world around us computed in mysterious and
wondrous ways. There was no such thing as unconventional computation.
There were mathematical events beneath which one can retrospectively
detect a sort of subliminal prescience. In 1965 Hartley Rogers gave a fasci-
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nating talk (judging by the 1967 paper11 that came out of it) at the Tenth
Logic Colloquium in Leicester, England. What was remarkable was the fo-
cus12 on the large scale structure of the Turing universe, via the notions of
invariance and definability that we have identified as relevant to the emer-
gence of form in wide range of different environments. There was in evidence
a ‘Hartley Rogers Agenda’, built around a number of deep and difficult ques-
tions about the global character of the Turing degrees. Over the years, there
has been a growing intuition that Rogers’ questions are key to pinning down
how higher order relations on the real world can appear to be computed.
Much of the progress with these questions rests on the richness of Tur-
ing structure discovered so far. Mathematically structural pathology is a
disappointment. Out in the real world pathology is super-abundant, both
generator of and avatar of a richness of real world definability. In the Turing
universe. the pathology takes on a parallel role, becoming the raw material
for a multitude of definable relations, counterparts to visibly ‘computable’
structure out in the real world.
6 UNDEFINABLE RELATIONS
We might have developed the view of unconventional computation as higher
type computation in various guises – emergence, definability etc – in other
contexts. Another fruitful workspace would have been that of artificial in-
telligence/neuroscience. Each has it’s special strengths. That of the physics
is the clear way in which it displays the fragility of definability, and the
consequences of its failure.
Failures of definability are not necessarily negative in their impact. Many
friendly features of our universe depend on them. In physics, there is a wide
range of special symmetries underpinning aspects of our observed world. A
symmetry is of course an instance of an automorphism at work, maybe small-
scale or very selective in its scope. More important broad impact symmetries
include the relationship of the SU(3) symmetry group to the quark model
underlying hadrons, for which Murray Gell-Mann got a nobel prize in 1969.
11H. Rogers, Jr., Some problems of definability in recursive function theory, in Sets,
Models and Recursion Theory (J. N. Crossley, ed.), Proceedings of the Summer School
in Mathematical Logic and Tenth Logic Colloquium, Leicester, August–September, 1965,
North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 183–201.
12Hartley Rogers’ 1965 Agenda, in ’Logic Colloquium ’98’ (S.R. Buss, P. Hajek and P.
Pudlak, eds.), Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the ASL, held in
Prague, Czech Republic, August 9-15, 1998, Lecture Notes in Logic 13, Association for
Symbolic Logic/A.K. Peters, Natick, Massachusetts, pp. 154-172.
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One of the interests of such particular examples is that they point to the
possibility of a rich automorphism structure underlying the basic causal
structure, and hence to the identification on new relations defined/computed
within the physics with potentially far-reaching explanatory power.
Back in the underlying Turing model, there is some disagreement about
the potential character of the automorphism group of both the local and
the global structures. An interest in the so-called ‘Bi-interpretability Con-
jecture’ originating with Leo Harrington goes back around 30 years, dur-
ing which time various people have managed to prove partial versions of
the conjecture, with interesting consequences for the automorphism groups.
Essentially, what the conjecture says is that there is a close enough corre-
spondence between the structure of the Turing degrees and that of second
order arithmetic for the two structures to share a number of characteristics,
particularly related to automorphisms and definability. A full verification of
bi-interpretability would impose rigidity on the Turing universe, and invali-
date it as a model for the real universe, which appears to be far from rigid.
There is no consensus of informed guesses concerning rigidity.
Failure of rigidity would have potentially dramatic consequences for the
longstanding search for a ‘realistic’ interpretation of quantum non locality
and the collapse of the wave function in conjunction with a measurement.
What we commonly have is the deterministic continuous evolution of the
wave equation describing a physical system via Schro¨dinger’s equation, in-
volving the superposition of basis states. We may then have a probabilistic
non-local discontinuous change due to a measurement – and observe a jump
to a single basis state. There are various interpretations of this. The sim-
plest is that what we are encountering is a level of failure of definability
at the ontological level of the quantum world — there is just not enough
connectivity and information down there to uniquely identify basis states.
While the intervention entailed by the measurement changes the situation.
If it is a higher type relationship of definability gets unconventionally com-
puted, it is allowed to operate non-locally, without any of the usual problems
for the physics.
There are wider ramifications to such a ‘realistic’ and immanent deciding
of physical transitions. The Many Worlds interpretation and its Multiverse
derivatives begin to look pleasingly redundant. It is not good that this
becomes yet another misfortune to impact on Hugh Everett III and his
family – nowadays represented by his son Mark, the talented lead singer of
the EELS. No doubt, even with such a powerfully persuasive replacement for
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Many Worlds and the various Multiverses, via unconventional computation,
it will be hard to divert David Deutsch from his view13 that:
. . . understanding the multiverse is a precondition for under-
standing reality as best we can. Nor is this said in a spirit of
grim determination to seek the truth no matter how unpalatable
it may be . . . It is, on the contrary, because the resulting world-
view is so much more integrated, and makes more sense in so
many ways, than any previous world-view, and certainly more
than the cynical pragmatism which too often nowadays serves as
surrogate for a world-view amongst scientists.
But there are many others, like presumably George Ellis,14 would breath a
sigh of relief:
The issue of what is to be regarded as an ensemble of ‘all possible’
universes is unclear, it can be manipulated to produce any result
you want . . . The argument that this infinite ensemble actually
exists can be claimed to have a certain explanatory economy
(Tegmark 1993), although others would claim that Occam’s razor
has been completely abandoned in favour of a profligate excess
of existential multiplicity, extravagantly hypothesized in order to
explain the one universe that we do know exists.
There are many other ways in which the admission of an extended com-
putational repertoire can bolster the integrity of the observed ‘one universe
that we do know exists’. Physics is just one area can benefit from the math-
ematics of definability, invariance, emergence and higher type computation.
Alan Turing would have been fascinated.
13David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, Allen Lane, 1997, p.48.
14The Unique Nature of Cosmology, in Revisiting the Foundations of Relativistic Physics
(eds. Abhay Ashtekar et al), Kluwer, 1996, p.198.
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